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11.1 Introduction
In the years preceding Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in 1999, public financial 
management	at	 all	 ters	of	government	had	 reached	 ts	nadr.	After	over	a	decade	
of	mltary	msrule,	governance	had	 touched	bottom	wth	 the	 substtuton	of	arb-
trary	decsons	for	proper	process,	and	the	massve	lootng	of	state	assets	by	General	








At first the emphasis of the new administration was on restoring rule-bound fi-
nancial management, and one of the first steps of the government was to reissue 
Financial Instructions,	the	long-neglected	set	of	regulatons	governng	the	conduct	
of government financial transactions. The new government also set about tackling the 
overhang	of	nherted	problems,	such	as	external	debt	and	nternal	payment	arrears,	
and	started	 the	process	of	catchng	up	 n	complaton	and	audtng	of	government	
accounts and financial statements. However, aggregate spending at all levels of gov-
ernment	remaned	revenue	drven,	as	ol	prces	began	recoverng	from	ther	global	
lows	at	the	end	of	mltary	rule,	and	reached	about	45	per	cent	of	GDP	by	2001,	an	
uncharacteristically high figure for a developing country, masking huge inefficien-
cies in spending. Overall, rapid fiscal expansion in 1999–2001 had looked as if old 
habts	of	wasteful	spendng	were	returnng.	At	 the	federal	 level	 there	were	efforts	
made	 to	 mprove	 the	qualty	of	 spendng,	partcularly	wth	 the	Captal	Budget,	 n	
whch	there	was	an	early	realzaton	that	the	bulk	of	spendng	was	gong	on	long-
runnng	projects	of	doubtful	value	and	lttle	prospect	of	early	completon.	But	n	the	
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man,	whle	some	mprovements	were	launched	by	the	federal	government	and	some	
of	the	more	progressve-mnded	states,	much	of	the	fundamental	weakness	n	publc	
financial management remained unaddressed. It seemed that for the first four years 




a strong reform mandate from the president. Since then, significant steps have been 
taken to increase the transparency of the budget process, ensure more efficient cash 
management,	and	reform	procurement	processes.	A	major	effort	was	made	to	mod-
ernize the legal framework for public financial management, through the drafting of 
new laws, updating the colonial era basic finance law, introducing a new audit law 
that	promses	greater	ndependence	to	the	supreme	audt	nsttuton,	makng	statutory	
prncples	of	open,	compettve	tenderng	and	creatng	an	autonomous	procurement	
regulator. The government also drafted the fiscal responsibility legislation aimed at 
smoothng	ol	revenues	and	endng	the	boom/borrowng/bust	syndrome	of	prevous	




plined fiscal policy by the federal government. Budgets since 2004 have been made 
on	the	bass	of	an	assumed	long	run	prce	of	ol,	wth	excess	revenues	sterlzed	n	the	
Bank	of	Ngera.	Whle	real	spendng	has	been	mantaned,	the	share	of	consoldated	
budget	 spendng	 n	GDP	has	 fallen	 to	a	more	sustanable	 (and	absorbable)	35	per	
cent. The counterpart of fiscal prudence has been the build-up of substantial foreign 
exchange	reserves	n	the	Central	Bank.	Partly	n	recognton	of	these	achevements,	
n	2005	Ngera	won	substantal	external	debt	reducton	through	the	Pars	Club.
At the same time many features of weakness in public financial management 
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Although	parastatal	subsdes	are	now	less	that	they	once	were,	they	reman	sg-
nificant, with budget subsidization of the power, railways and ports sectors amount-
ng	to	0.9	per	cent	of	GDP	n	2004.	Furthermore,	the	new	fully	funded	publc	penson	
scheme introduced in 2004 has major funding gaps, arising from the need to finance 
old	and	new	penson	systems	smultaneously	f	the	full	costs	of	transton	are	to	be	
borne.	
However,	 the	most	 persstent	 problem	 has	 been	 the	 qualty	 of	 spendng,	wth	
continuing inefficiency and leakages in both the current and capital budgets. In the 
former there is inadequate funding of maintenance and operational costs and inflated 
payroll costs, due to a combination of payroll fraud and overstaffing. Projects con-
tnue	to	be	poorly	planned	and	executed,	wth	long	delays	n	mplementng	projects.	
It	s	as	f	Ngera	at	both	federal	and	state	levels	s	nvestng	ever-ncreasng	amounts	








All of this points to the verdict that the problem in Nigeria is low efficiency of 
budget	spendng	rather	than	nadequate	amounts	of	fundng	at	all	levels	of	govern-
ment. In turn the causes of low efficiency of public spending reach deep into the way 
n	whch	budgets	are	made	and	mplemented,	the	formal	and	nformal	ncentves	of	
budget	actors,	and	the	way	government	at	all	levels	s	managed,	both	bureaucratcally	
and politically. With continuing high oil prices, there is undoubtedly fiscal space 
to expand government spending, but there is a risk that, given weak public finance 
management	(PFM)	capacty,	scalng	up	to	acheve	the	country’s	development	goals	
better	may	result	once	agan	n	heavy	msmanagement	of	ol	surpluses.	And,	as	past	
experience has shown, there are benefits from not spending surplus revenues imme-
dately,	but	spreadng	ther	use	over	the	ol	prce	cycle.	





processes,	but	also	n	 the	capacty	to	follow	them.	The	latter	 s	at	 the	heart	of	 the	
challenge.	For,	whle	the	desgn	of	Ngera’s	PFM	system	clearly	needs	modernzng,	
even	to	operate	t	as	once	ntended	would	be	an	mmedate	mprovement.	
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11.2 GlobalstandardsandthePEFAframework
In	the	past	two	decades	there	has	been	a	growng	nterest	n	developng	nternatonal	
standards across the full spectrum of public financial management. This has been 
led	by	nsttutons	lke	the	Internatonal	Monetary	Fund	(IMF),	the	Organzaton	for	




INTOSAI	 has	 developed	 standards	 for	 government	 external	 audtng,	 and	 IFAC	










ther factor has been the growing realization that the fight against corruption depends 





a developmental as well as a fiduciary dimension.
The	PEFA	Performance	Framework	contans	28	ndcators	dvded	nto	three	sets.	
The first four look at aggregate expenditure and revenue out-turns relative to the 
orgnal	budget,	as	a	measure	of	ts	credblty.	The	second	set	of	sx	ndcators	looks	
at	cross-cuttng	ssues	of	comprehensveness	and	transparency.	The	thrd	set,	of	18	
indicators, looks at the budget cycle, including whether the budget reflects govern-
ment	polcy	prortes,	whether	there	s	predctablty	and	control	n	budget	execu-





PFM system, which reflects strong government reform commitment. In more than 
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Table 11.1	 PEFA	ndcator	set





B. Key cross-cutting issues: comprehensiveness and transparency 
PI-5	 Classification of the budget 
PI-6	 Comprehensveness	of	nformaton	ncluded	n	budget	documentaton	
PI-7	 Extent	of	unreported	government	operatons	
PI-8	 Transparency of intergovernmental fiscal relations 
PI-9	 Oversight of aggregate fiscal risk from other public sector entities
PI-10	 Public access to key fiscal information 
C. Budget cycle 
	 C()	Polcy-based	budgetng	
PI-11 Orderlness	and	partcpaton	n	the	annual	budget	process	




























building, including in the Budget Office, and in such areas of financial accountability 
as	reportng,	montorng	and	dsclosure.






significant on particular aspects of the PFM operations.
Whle	most	 areas	 of	 PFM	 contnue	 to	 show	weaknesses,	 these	weaknesses	 n	
most	cases	are	recognzed	by	the	government,	and	approprate	reform	efforts	are	
ether	ongong	or	planned.








At	 the	 same	 tme,	 for	a	number	of	 ndcators,	performance	 remans	weak,	and	
lttle	or	no	materal	progress	has	been	made	recently.	These	 nclude	 the	 ncdence	
of government spending that remains off budget; the consolidation of fiscal data for 






ture efficiency, including those in procurement, have been much slower at the sub-
natonal	level,	where	more	than	half	of	consoldated	budget	expendtures	are	admn-
stered.	
Given the constitutional autonomy of state governments in fiscal and financial 
management	matters,	the	FGN	can	do	lttle	by	way	of	drect	nterventon.	Instead,	
the	FGN	 should	 look	 for	 an	 alternatve,	more	 cooperatve	 approach	 for	 engagng	
the	states	n	PFM	reforms	by	provdng	them	wth	techncal	assstance,	gvng	them	
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11.4 Nigeria’sperformanceagainsttheindividualindicators
11.4.1 PI-1:Aggregate expenditure out-turn compared to original approved
budget





budget	ex ante and	the	budget	ex post. The first is predictability of funding for budget 
users,	the	mnstres,	departments	and	agences	whch	delver	servces.	A	second	s	




total	 spendng,	 excludng	debt	 servce,	 fell	 short	 by	38.3	per	 cent	 of	 approprated	
spending, chiefly because capital releases were 71.4 per cent less than the approved 
budget.	Ths	was	partly	because	 total	 revenues	were	9.1	per	 cent	 less	 than	antc-
pated, but chiefly because the legislature in approving the budget more than doubled 
the capital budget relative to what the executive proposed, much of it on unjustified 
pork-barrel	projects.	Ths	left	the	executve	no	alternatve	but	to	restrct	releases	to	






falls	a	 long	way	short	of	acceptable	standards	of	budget	predctablty,	and	 ths	 s	
one of the factors that contribute to the inefficiency of spending. State governments 
show	a	smlar	msmatch	between	approved	and	executed	budgets,	but	 ths	 s	 less	
due	to	state	legslatures	expandng	the	governor’s	budget,	and	more	about	governors	
proposing ambitious capital programs and being unable to either finance or execute 
them.
The	 underlyng	 need	 at	 the	 natonal	 level	 s	 to	 reach	 greater	 accord	 between	




flaw in Nigeria’s constitutional arrangements, given that more than three quarters 
of	government	revenues	derve	not	from	taxes	on	ctzens	(whch	would	constran	
lawmakers)	but	from	ol.	For	others,	the	power	to	change	the	executve’s	budget	s	
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efforts in recent years of the Budget Office of the Federation to brief the National 
Assembly on the fiscal outlook, and seek their support for budgets made within a 
Medum	Term	Expendture	Framework	(MTEF).	
11.4.2 PI-2: Composition of expenditure out-turn compared to original
approvedbudget
Ths	ndcator	measures	the	extent	to	whch	actual	expendture	composton	vares	
from	the	composton	of	 the	orgnal	budget.	The	 ratonale	of	 the	 ndcator	 s	 that	
budgets	should	be	capable	of	mplementng	the	polces	and	programmes	proposed	
by	the	executve	and	approved	by	the	legslature.
At	 the	 federal	 level	 there	 s	 relatvely	 lttle	devaton	between	 the	 share	of	 the	
man	sector	mnstres,	departments	and	agences	(MDAs)	n	the	approved	and	the	
executed	budget.	Furthermore,	any	devatons	that	can	be	measured	are	dwarfed	by	






and maintenance spending, and this contributes to inefficiency. There is also redis-
trbuton	wthn	the	captal	budget,	as	funds	are	drected	towards	what	the	executve	
regards	as	hgher-prorty	projects.	When	ths	results	n	the	completon	rather	than	
partial implementation of projects, the reallocations are efficiency enhancing. How-
ever,	the	latter	has	not	been	common	budget	executon	practce	n	Ngera.	A	smlar	
pattern	can	be	found	at	the	state	level.
11.4.3 PI-3: Aggregate revenue out-turn compared to original approved
budget
Ths	ndcator	measures	the	realsm	of	government	revenue	projectons,	and	the	n-




casts, chiefly thanks to unexpectedly high international oil prices. But this was due 
more	to	luck	than	good	plannng.	If	ol	revenues	are	set	to	one	sde	and	devatons	n	
non-ol	tax	collectons	are	analysed,	a	rather	dfferent	pcture	emerges.	In	both	2003	



























fined benefit scheme for public servants, and pension rolls have long been unreliable. 
In	2004	the	Penson	Act	provded	for	 the	 ntroducton	of	funded	penson	schemes	
across	the	publc	sector,	and	the	establshment	of	a	Natonal	Penson	Commsson,	
which has begun a verification exercise. The 2006 FGN budget set aside funds for 
clearng	most	federal	penson	arrears.	
11.4.5 PI-5: Classification of the budget
Best	practce	s	the	operaton	of	budget	systems	that	are	based	on	the	admnstratve,	
economic and sub-functional/programme classifications, using Government Finan-
cial Statistics/Classification of Functions of Government	standards.
Nigeria’s budgets at all levels of government employ traditional classification 
systems, which are based mainly on administrative classifications and some econom-
ic classifications. In this way the country has lagged behind international develop-
ments	that	have	seen	the	emergence	and	adopton	of	unversal	standards	whch,	wth	
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modern	 nformaton	 technology,	 can	 provde	 polcy-makers	 and	 budget	managers	
wth	nformaton	on	PFM	n	a	tmely	and	more	meanngful	way.	Furthermore,	the	
broader budgeting, reporting and accounting system, of which the classification sys-
tem	forms	a	central	part,	has	deterorated	n	ts	applcaton	over	the	years.	The	budget	
estmates	are	mostly	too	detaled	for	legslatve	oversght,	and	the	accounts	are	too	
coarse-grained for management purposes, while the classification system allows no 
functonal	analyss.
As	long	as	the	prmary	objectve	of	PFM	mprovements	s	better	control	of	spend-
ing by budget units, an administrative-based classification system serves. And the 
most	urgent	need	s	better	n-year	reportng	by	MDAs	under	the	present	system.	But,	
as	the	polcy	behnd	spendng	becomes	more	mportant,	a	more	modern	budget	clas-
sification system will be demanded. Some steps are now being taken, partly by the 
Accountant-General	of	the	Federaton,	to	mprove	reportng	(through	the	Accountng	
Transacton	Reportng	and	Recordng	System	(ATRRS)),	and	to	amend	the	exstng	
chart of accounts. Also the introduction of integrated financial management systems 
n	some	states	on	ther	own	account	s	promptng	change.	
11.4.6 PI-6: Comprehensiveness of information included in budget
documentation
A	best-practce	budget	wll	provde	nformaton	on	the	macroeconomc	assumptons	
underlying the budget, the fiscal deficit defined by international standards and financ-
ing, financial assets at the beginning of the year and prior years’ out-turns, explana-
tions of the budgetary implications of new policies, tax expenditures and fiscal risk, 












The	budget	presentaton	has	changed	 lttle	 n	decades,	wth	a	gap	between	 the	
budget	speech,	whch	s	very	aggregate,	and	the	mass	of	detal	n	the	estmates	but	
wthout	analytcal	summary	tables.	Such	an	unbalanced	presentaton	stmulates	leg-
islators (who need little prompting) to ignore the underlying fiscal strategy of the 
submtted	budget	proposal	and	mmerse	themselves	n	the	detals	of	spendng.
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11.4.7 PI-7:Extentofunreportedgovernmentoperations
Governments	should	am	for	comprehensve	budgets	and	accounts	that	cover	all	rev-
enue and expenditure flows for all institutional units that are part of that government 
ter	to	whch	the	budget	pertans.	In	practcal	terms	ths	means	ensurng	that	unre-
ported	extra-budgetary	expendture	(other	than	donor-funded	projects,	whch	can	be	
difficult to capture) is insignificant (below 1 per cent of total expenditure). 
As already noted in this chapter, a significant proportion (42 per cent of non-inter-
est	expendture	on	average	n	the	past	three	years)	of	spendng	by	federal	enttes	les	
outsde	the	federal	budget.	Ths	serously	undermnes	the	comprehensveness	of	the	
annual budget. The main categories of spending outside the budget are: (i) first line 
charges of the Federation Accounts (chiefly investment costs of NNPC), (ii) donor 
funds, and (iii) expenditure financed with MDA’s own revenues. In 2005 settlement 
of	external	debt	arrears	as	part	of	the	hstorc	Pars	debt	deal	was	extra-budgetary.	
Snce	 2005	 a	 further	 category	 has	 been	 added	 –	major	 nfrastructure	 nvestments	
(prmarly	power)	funded	wth	money	that	s	accumulated	n	the	excess	ol	savngs	
account.	
Constitutional interpretation and budgetary principles appear to be in conflict 










Including donor-financed spending in the budget is a problem in many poor coun-
tres,	and	n	the	case	of	Ngera	s	perhaps	a	lesser	problem	because	the	magntude	of	
donor assistance in relative terms is not so great. Still, it would be prudent to reflect at 
least	all	government	external	borrowng	n	the	budget.	More	mportantly,	the	falure	
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be	a	means,	ether	 though	publshed	accounts	or	statstcal	surveys,	 to	ensure	 that	
these have been used for their intended purpose by their ultimate beneficiaries.
The	 dvson	 of	 responsbltes	 s	 generally	 set	 out	 n	 the	 1999	 consttuton,	















supposed to be updated every five years on the basis of proposals developed by the 
RMAFC,	but	ths	dd	not	take	place	recently	on	grounds	of	lack	of	consensus.
The flow of transfers is generally predictable and transparent. There are two is-
sues, however, which affect transparency. The first is prior deductions from the Fed-










11.4.9 PI-9: Oversight of aggregate fiscal riskfromotherpublicsectorentities
Best practice is centralized oversight of fiscal risk through timely reports and audited 
accounts	 from	all	major	autonomous	agences	and	publc	enterprses,	 rules	whch	
prevent sub-national governments from generating fiscal liabilities for the central 
government, regular monitoring of the net fiscal position of all levels of sub-national 
government, and regular consolidation of these reports into an overall fiscal risk as-
sessment	by	the	central	government.
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There are presently several sources of risk to Nigeria’s public finances. While 
the country’s large parastatal sector is required by law to present accounts and finan-
cal	statements	to	state	and	federal	audtors-general,	submssons	are	often	late,	and	




A second source of fiscal risk is the lack of a hard budget constraint on state gov-
ernments and the absence of a mechanism for monitoring their fiscal positions. In the 
first years of the return to civilian rule, many states borrowed heavily from domestic 
financial markets, short-term and at high cost, and, until rising oil prices improved 
ther	revenues,	servcng	ths	debt	dstorted	budgets	and	n	many	cases	led	to	arrears	
in salaries and other payments. The third source of fiscal risk, obviously, is the heavy 
dependence	of	governments	 n	Ngera	on	 revenues	 from	ol	and	 the	attendant	ol	
prce	cycle.	
Of vital importance to the management of fiscal risk at all levels is the outcome 
of current efforts to put in place a new legal framework for public financial man-
agement,	 and	 thus	a	more	 responsble	budget	process.	Crtcal	here	are	 the	Fscal	
Responsblty	Bll	(FRB),	the	Budget	Procedure	Bll,	and	amendments	to	the	1958	
Fnance	(Control	and	Management)	Act	(F(C&M)A).	As	currently	drafted,	the	FRB,	




11.4.10 PI-10: Public access to key fiscal information
The	standard	here	s	the	publc	avalablty	of	a	complete	budget	package	as	soon	as	
t	s	tabled	n	the	legslature,	of	n-year	budget	executon	reports,	tmely	year-end	au-
dited financial statements, external audit reports, and regular publication of contract 
awards	above	$100,000.
Here	Ngera	scores	very	poorly;	there	s	very	lttle	nformaton	on	Ngera’s	gov-








more transparent public finances. This is encouraging; at bottom the challenge is to 
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develop a culture amongst government officials to regularly release and not with-
hold the type of information on government finances that is normal in a democratic 
country.	Partly,	the	exstng	culture	s	a	legacy	of	mltary	rule,	when	any	release	of	













can approve the next year budget by the end of the current financial year, this seldom 
happens,	ether	because	the	legslature	takes	longer,	or	because	budget	preparaton	s	
delayed.	In	recent	years,	notwthstandng	efforts	to	get	the	budget	approved	n	tme,	
the Appropriations Bill was not passed until after the first quarter of the new financial 
year,	necesstatng	provsonal	fundng	warrants.	Ths	 s	compounded	by	the	often	






insufficient time to explain to the legislature and get their understanding of the macr-
oeconomic fundamentals underpinning public finances, to get ministers to agree col-
lectvely	to	the	budget	framework,	and	to	allow	MDAs	to	prortze	ther	spendng.	
However,	 there	 have	 been	 some	 mportant	 developments	 n	 recent	 years.	The	









Stocktaking the Reforms in Public Financial Management 
shp	that	characterzes	relatons	at	the	federal	level.	Ths	enables	budgets	to	be	sub-
mtted	on	tme,	and	generally	passed	before	or	shortly	after	the	end	of	the	current	









and therefore difficult to change, partly a matter of political incentives of elected 
officials who seek to add programmes they can be associated with to budgets, and 
partly	amenable	to	better	communcatons	and	stronger	accountablty	arrangements,	
whch	have	begun	to	mprove.	
11.4.12 PI-12: Multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and 
budgeting
Best practice is three-year or more rolling forecasts of fiscal aggregates, on which 
annual	budgets	are	based,	annual	debt	sustanablty	analyses	for	both	domestc	and	
external	debt,	exstence	of	sector	strateges	wth	full	costng	of	recurrent	and	nvest-




BOF has prepared multi-year aggregate fiscal frameworks, based upon conserva-
tve	estmates	of	the	expected	prce	of	ol,	and	used	ths	framework	to	bref	both	the	
legslature	and	the	Federal	Executve	Councl	on	the	forthcomng	budget	preparaton	
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ths	requres	much	better	nformaton	on	costs	of	servce	delvery	and	these	must	be	
generated, as also must information on the efficiency and effectiveness of spend-
ng	(whch	s	very	poor	at	present).	It	also	requres	a	major	nvestment	n	capacty	













ness is difficult to assess. 
Actions to remedy these deficiencies are under way. The Federal Internal Rev-
enue	Servce	(FIRS)	has	ntated	a	package	of	legslatve	amendments	to	tax	laws,	
remedyng	some	of	the	exstng	faults	n	VAT,	such	as	the	absence	of	a	regstraton	










Coordnaton	between	FIRS	headquarters	 and	 ts	branches	 n	 the	 states,	whch	
are	responsble	for	regsterng	taxpayers,	s	weak,	leadng	to	naccuraces	n	taxpayer	
nformaton	and	consequently	n	tax	collectons.	There	s	no	sngle	taxpayer	regster	
yet.	Non-complance	penaltes	are	ether	 too	 low	 to	consttute	an	 ncentve	or	 too	
complex	 to	be	 effectve.	The	 recently	 establshed	audt	 departments	of	FIRS	 lack	
capacty,	and	wth	no	systematc	collecton	of	tax	data,	let	alone	ndustry	data,	the	
process of risk identification cannot be begun.
Efforts	are	under	way	to	construct	a	sngle	taxpayer	database	whch	wll	be	com-
puterized, enabling the adoption of a single Tax Identification Number (TIN). This 















staff	 salares	more	 compettve	 than	 regular	 cvl	 servce	 scales.	Ths	would	help,	
combned	wth	better	oversght	and	governance,	to	break	the	nformal	practces	that	
have	become	embedded	n	many	areas.
11.4.16 PI-16: Predictability in the availability of funds for commitment of
expenditures
For	budgets	to	be	predctable,	they	need	to	be	approved	on	tme,	respected	by	the	
executive, flexible enough to accommodate a reasonable level of fiscal uncertainty, 
and	 supported	by	 a	 cash	management	 system	 that	 ensures	 that	 the	government	 s	
never	llqud.
Analyss	of	actual	monthly	releases	to	spendng	departments	over	the	past	four	
years shows continuation of significant variability in the amounts provided by the 
treasury.	Ths	expendture	nstablty	s	only	partly	explanable	by	monthly	revenue	
variations, which have fluctuated somewhat less recently; this stabilization is in part 
thanks to oil-price-based budgeting. The introduction of an oil-price-based fiscal 
rule,	however,	has	helped	less	than	hoped	for	because	t	does	not	smooth	varatons	n	
ol	producton;	wth	domestc	petroleum	prce	controls	n	place,	budgetary	resources	
have had to be diverted to offsetting fuel subsidies that fluctuate in line with world oil 
prces.	In	addton,	on	the	expendture	sde	the	government	has	struggled	wth	cash	






predictability of funds for efficient and effective public expenditure.
0 Stevens and Freinkman
11.4.17 PI-17: Recording and management of cash balances, debt and
guarantees
In	well	functonng	PFM	systems,	domestc	and	foregn	debt	records	are	complete,	
regularly	updated,	 reconcled	 and	 reported	 to	management	on	 a	 regular	bass.	All	
cash	balances	are	calculated	daly	and	consoldated,	and	central	government’s	con-
tractng	of	loans	and	ssuance	of	guarantees	are	made	aganst	transparent	crtera	and	










ty	wth	open	market	operatons	 to	meet	 short-term	 lqudty	needs,	and	 ncreased	
ablty	of	the	government	Cash	Management	Commttee	to	reduce	varablty	n	cash	
releases.	
By	contrast,	 at	 the	 federal	 level	 the	area	of	debt	management	has	been	one	of	






with the permission of the FMoF, normally given only after DMO financial analysis, 
Federal	 Executve	Councl	 and	Natonal	Assembly	 approval.	 Parastatals	 typcally	
borrow	through	the	FMoF,	whch	contracts	the	loan	and	on-lends	the	proceeds,	thus	





Governments	wth	good	payroll	 controls	 can	 lnk	drectly	 and	 regularly	 reconcle	


























Publc	 procurement	 s	 an	 area	 where	 the	 government	 has	 made	 consderable	
progress	at	 the	federal	 level,	aganst	a	background	of	 large-scale	abuse	durng	the	
years	of	mltary	rule	of	what	was	orgnally	a	sound	process,	through	rgged,	non-
compettve	and	costly	award	of	contracts.	The	ntal	efforts	of	cvlan	government	






ng,	 avodance	 of	 contract	 splttng,	 natonal	 advertsng,	 and	 transparent	 bd	 and	
proposal	evaluaton	crtera.	BMPIU	has	been	hghly	successful	n	reducng	contract	
costs, and its certification of ‘due process’ is required before the release of budgetary 
funds	by	the	Accountant-General.	The	focus	thus	far	of	‘due	process’	has	been	the	
Captal	Budget.	Rules	for	drect	contractng	have	been	tghtened.
Legslaton	 s	 now	 before	 the	 Natonal	Assembly	 that	 would	 convert	 BMPIU	
nto	an	autonomous	procurement	regulator	wthn	the	executve	branch,	empowered	
to	 ssue	 procurement	 rules,	 consstent	 wth	 statutory	 prncples	 of	 open	 compet-
tve	tenderng,	and	wth	a	separate	appeals	mechansm.	It	wll	be	mportant	for	ths	












nificant misuse, and very limited use of emergency procedures.
The	FGN’s	 current	 control	 framework	 dates	 back	 to	 the	 pre-ndependence	F-














The	 remakng	of	 the	budget	 through	 the	 cash	 release	 system,	necessary	 n	 the	
executve’s	vew	 to	 restore	macroeconomc	balance	and	spendng	prortes	 to	 the	
budget,	 leads	to	delays	and	unpredctablty	of	fundng	to	MDAs.	The	late	release	










Stocktaking the Reforms in Public Financial Management 
duced	excessve	advance	fee	payments	on	contracts.	The	FMoF	now	receves	more	
timely information on ministerial spending, and the Accountant-General’s Office has 
been taking the first steps towards installing an integrated financial management sys-
tem.	The	challenge	now	s	to	ncrease	the	pressure	on	MDAs	to	report	and	reconcle	
accounts, placing sanctions on those accounting officers who do not exercise proper 
stewardship over their votes, and to place greater emphasis on financial manage-
ment	as	a	crteron	of	career	advancement	wthn	the	cvl	servce.	Smlar	challenges	
preval	at	the	state	level,	where	a	small	number	of	states	have	nvested	n	ntegrated	




meets professional standards and focuses on systemic issues, adheres to a fixed 
schedule, and produces reports to the audited entity, the finance ministry and the 






sionally qualified. The weaknesses of the present system are recognized, including 




the demand side of the financial accountability equation. Presently, the climate for 
PFM at all levels of government is ‘soft’, with few officers sanctioned for irregulari-
ties. Thus management response to internal audit findings is disappointing, and this 
feeds	back	to	the	qualty	of	audt.	To	tghten	the	system,	the	FMoF,	wth	the	pres-
dent’s	backng,	needs	more	emphatcally	to	wthhold	releases	to	departments	whch	




















and generally operating effective financial control systems. In turn this reflects the 
soft financial management culture that pervades the public sector at all levels; chang-
ng	ths	to	make	reportng	and	accountng	valued	for	ts	own	sake	s	a	major	govern-
ance	challenge	for	future	admnstratons.






















including by programme beneficiaries. The hope is that the monitoring of MDG 
programmes	wll	spearhead	better	montorng	and	reportng	practce	across	govern-
ment.






garding data accuracy; and (iv) reliable instruments for data verification, based upon 













ng	per	dems and other benefits, with reporting on outputs a secondary objective. 
Agan	t	s	hoped	that	the	more	rgorous	approach	to	reportng	and	montorng	of	the	
MDG	projects	wll	lead	the	way	to	better	across	the	board	practces.	If	t	contnues,	




to be verified. 
11.4.25 PI-25: Quality and timeliness of annual financial statements
The	standard	here	s	the	tmely	producton	of	consoldated	government	statements,	
which include full information on revenue, expenditure and financial assets/liabili-
tes,	consstent	wth	IPSAS	or	equvalent	natonal	standards,	and	are	submtted	for	
external audit within six months of the end of the fiscal year.
Ths	s	an	area	where	performance	at	the	federal	level	has	been	exceptonally	poor	
– as of the beginning of 2006, no full set of audited government financial statements 
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attached over the years to financial accountability. States present a mixed picture 
of	laggards,	but	there	are	some	states	whch	are	ahead	of	the	federal	government	n	
producing financial accounts on time. 
11.4.26 PI-26:Scope,natureandfollow-upofexternalaudit
The	best-practce	standard	s	for	all	enttes	of	central	government	to	be	audted	annu-
ally. A full range of financial audits (covering revenue, expenditure and financial as-
sets/labltes)	and	some	aspects	of	performance	audt	are	expected	to	be	performed	
to a generally accepted standard, focusing on significant and systemic issues. Audit 
reports	are	submtted	to	the	legslature	wthn	four	months	of	the	end	of	perod	cov-
ered and, in the case of financial statements, from their receipt by the audit office. 
There is clear evidence of effective and timely follow-up on audit findings.
Ngera’s	consttuton	sets	a	90-day	lmt	for	audtors-general	to	submt	ther	re-
ports to the legislatures, and federal Financial Regulations require that the financial 
accounts be submitted for audit within six months of the end of the financial year. 
Were	 ths	 tmetable	 to	 be	 adhered	 to,	Ngera	would	meet	 the	 standards	 as	 far	 as	
tmelness	s	concerned.	As	already	noted,	the	Audtor-General’s	chef	constrant	s	
delayed	submsson	of	accounts	 to	audt	 from	the	Accountant-General.	Audt	cov-
erage	 extends	 to	 all	mnstres,	 extra-mnsteral	 departments	 and	 agences,	 and	 s	
chiefly compliance based.
Surprisingly, there is currently no specific legislation covering the powers and 
dutes	of	the	Audtor-General,	the	prevous	law	havng	been	excluded	from	the	1991	





ence of the supreme audit authority, freeing his office from debilitating civil service 
rules.	
Follow-up of audit findings is weak. There is no formal mechanism of reporting 
back to the Public Accounts Committees (PACs) on actions taken on previous find-
ngs,	and	no	systematc	follow-up	of	actons	taken	by	the	executve.	Moves	are	afoot	
to	gve	the	FMoF	the	authorty	to	do	ths.	A	new	audt	law	would	not	only	mandate	
reporting back on actions taken, but also spell out the penalties for accounting offic-
ers	of	non-complyng	MDAs.	On	ts	part,	there	s	a	need	for	the	supreme	audt	nst-
tuton	to	be	more	ambtous	n	ts	audts,	focusng	scarce	staff	resources	on	hgh-rsk	
areas, and more frankly evaluating the efficacy of financial control systems. There 
also needs to be more aggressive follow-up of individual audit findings by MDAs.
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11.4.27 PI-27:Legislativescrutinyoftheannualbudgetlaw
The benchmark best practice is for the legislature’s review to cover fiscal policies, 
medium-term fiscal framework and priorities, as well as details of revenue and 











bitter fights over the respective roles of the federal executive and the legislature in 
budget-making, resulting in gross inflation of ex ante budget, chiefly by Assembly’s 




delayed the approval of the new budget until well into the first half of the new finan-
cal	year.	
There	are	 steps	beng	undertaken	 to	make	budget-makng	 less	confrontatonal.	
When	the	Fscal	Responsblty	Law	s	passed,	each	ter	of	government	wll	have	to	
make its budgets consistent with the fiscal framework set by the FMoF. The inde-
pendent	Budget	Process	Bll	would	mandate	a	two-stage	process	of	budget	approval,	




a great deal of abuse has crept in. The challenge is twofold. The first part is to install 
a modern financial management legal framework for transparent and accountable 





of receipt, in-depth hearings in which officers of the audited department participate, 
and	the	ssue	of	recommendatons	by	the	legslature	to	be	mplemented	by	the	gov-
ernment.	





held, which are open to the public, officials are required to attend, and conclusions 
are	drawn	and	recommendatons	made.	If	the	Audt	Bll	now	before	the	legslature	s	
passed, this will give the SAI more independence, in terms of both staffing and mate-
rals,	whch	should	enable	t	to	serve	better	the	legslatve	revew.	Most	crtcal	s	the	
passage	of	the	Fscal	Responsblty	Bll,	whch	holds	the	hope	of	more	harmonous	
relations between the executive and the legislature on public financial management 
matters	n	the	future.
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